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Pragmatism in the Face of Death:
The Role of Facts in the Assisted Suicide Debate
Susan M. Wolf*
INTRODUCTION
Were any of us offered a choice between unrelieved agony
at life's end and assisted suicide,' we would probably choose
the latter. And if we were further assured that there was al-
ready a widespread practice of physicians directly and inten-
tionally causing death, we would fail to see why law should
block the relief we sought.
Then how is it that many of us continue to oppose legaliz-
ing the practice? To a large extent, the answer lies in the facts.
In reality we will not face that binary choice, as physicians can
relieve virtually all pain, certainly if they can sedate patients
to unconsciousness. And there is no real evidence of a wide-
spread practice of physicians directly and intentionally causing
death. Termination of life-sustaining treatment could be done
to kill, but there is no evidence it usually is. Similarly, we
have no persuasive evidence that physicians usually administer
pain relief or sedation to terminal patients with the intent to
end life. Indeed, it is not even clear that giving pain relief in
high doses or heavy sedation actually hastens death.
* Associate Professor of Law and Medicine, University of Minnesota
Law School, and Faculty Member, Center for Bioethics, University of Minne-
sota. A.B., Princeton University; J.D., Yale Law School. Thanks to Phil
Frickey for initial encouragement and later comments; to George Annas, John
Arras, Martin Benjamin, Gene Borgida, Meg Campbell, Jim Chen, Dan Far-
ber, Kathleen Foley, Larry Jacobs, Sandy Johnson, Jeff Kahn, Joanne Lynn,
Jim Poradek, Russell Portenoy, Mike Tonry, and Bob Truog for helpful cri-
tique and advice; to the University of Minnesota Law School Faculty Work-
shop for insightful suggestions; to my fellow panelists for thoughtful remarks
at the Association of American Law Schools meeting at which we presented
this symposium; to Ryan Johnson for able research assistance; and to the
University of Minnesota Center for Bioethics for support.
1. Throughout this Article, I use "assisted suicide" to mean physician-
assisted suicide.
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I discuss these factual issues below. But the point is that
facts matter. They do not alone resolve the outcome of the as-
sisted suicide debate; normative controversy figures large. But
they certainly alter the arguments and thus may affect that
outcome, by showing some claims to be based on clinical reali-
ties and others not. For in deciding whether to legalize as-
sisted suicide by statute or strike down state bans challenged
on their face, that aggregate reality counts more than the
idealized or imagined case.2 Yet this seemingly obvious truth
is deeply contested in the assisted suicide debate.
Nothing shows this more clearly than the litigation of
Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill.' Abstract rheto-
2. In Glucksberg and Quill the aggregate reality is more relevant than any
individual case because most of the Justices saw these as facial challenges to the
state statutes and none of the Justices saw them as challenges to statutes "as
applied" to specific named patients. The majority in Glucksberg characterized
the original suit as a facial challenge. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
2258, 2261 (1997). However, the Court noted that the Ninth Circuit had held
the challenged statute unconstitutional 'as applied to terminally ill competent
adults. .. .- Id. at 2262 (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d
790, 837 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). The Court thus proceeded to find Washing-
tons statute constitutional both "on its face... [and] 'as applied to competent,
terminally ill adults .... ." Id. at 2275 (quoting Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at
838). Justices O'Connor and Stevens treated the challenge as facial See id. at
2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring) and 2304-05 (Stevens, J., concurring). But see
id. at 2275 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring) (challenge is "as-applied," not facial). Yet
even the "as applied" construal of Glucksberg in the Ninth Circuit and by the
Supreme Court majority would consider the statute's application to a group
rather than named individuals, raising the question of what circumstances obtain
in the aggregate for the group. See id. at 2262 n.6 ('[d]eclaring a statute uncon-
stitutional as applied to members of a group is atypical but not uncommon7"
(quoting Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 798 n.9)). In Quill the majority clearly
regarded the challenge as facial See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293,2297 (1997).
As Justice Stevens noted, "The appropriate standard... [for] facial chal-
lenges.., has been the subject of debate within this Court." Glucksberg, 117
S. Ct. at 2304. See generally Michael C. Doff, Facial Challenges to State and
Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Physician-
Assisted Death: An Essay on Constitutional Rights and Remedies, 55 MD. L.
REV. 292 (1996). Justice Stevens argued that the Court had rejected the strict
standard of United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) ("no set of cir-
cumstances exists under which the Act would be valid"), and that the Court
instead had concluded in Glucksberg that the statute "is not invalid... in all
or most cases in which it might be applied." 117 S. Ct. at 2304-05. "[AIll or
most cases" again brings the aggregate reality to the fore. Cf. id. at 2309
(Stevens, J., concurring) (focusing on "the usual case").
When a legislature decides whether to legalize assisted suicide, it obvi-
ously must consider the circumstances arising in the aggregate, rather than
specific individual cases.
3. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash.
1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.
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ric warred with clinical data. At one level, all agreed on the
importance of facts.4 Yet the Second Circuit ignored the fac-
tual issues involved in deciding whether New York's distinc-
tion between termination of treatment and assisted suicide
was rational. The Ninth Circuit attended to some empirical
data, such as whether physicians already perform assisted
suicide covertly, but then based much of their reasoning on as-
sumptions without factual underpinning. In the Supreme
Court, respondents adverted to empirical work on some issues,
especially on the Dutch situation and what they called
"terminal sedation." Yet they advanced core arguments un-
supported or contradicted by the data. Petitioners also made
uneven use of the data, but at least announced their impor-
1996), rev'd sub. nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Quill v.
Koppel, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd sub noam. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d
716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
4. Petitioners and respondents, the circuit courts, and the Supreme
Court Justices all adverted to data on some points in their respective briefs
and opinions. This general agreement on the relevance of data distinguishes
the assisted suicide debate from a number of other debates in which the ex-
perts and academics have urged the importance of data, but that urging has
fallen on deaf or hostile ears. See, e.g., Mark H. Moore, Learning While Do-
ing: Linking Knowledge to Policy in the Development of Community Policing
and Violence Prevention in the United States, in INTEGRATING CRIME
PREVENTION STRATEGIES 301, 302-03 (Per-Olof H. Wikstr6m et al. eds., 1995).
Several factors probably encourage what may be unusual agreement on the
relevance of data in considering assisted suicide. First, data from the Nether-
lands have been a consistent focal point in the debate. See MARGARET PABST
BATrIN, THE LEAST WORST DEATH 130 (1994). Second, this is a debate about
what physicians do now and how they would act if assisted suicide were legal;
questions about physician behavior are now routinely addressed with data.
See, e.g., TROYEN A. BRENNAN & DONALD M. BERWIC!, NEW RULES:
REGULATION, MARKETS, AND THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 116-
20, 200-06 (1996). Third, an entire industry of health services research gen-
erates copious data on medical practice. See generally Andrew F. Coburn, The
Role of Health Services Research in Developing State Health Policy, 17
HEALTH AFF. 139 (1998); John M. Eisenberg, Health Services Research in a
Market-Oriented Health Care System, 17 HEALTH AFF. 98 (1998). And fourth,
state and federal government entities are regularly both health care regula-
tors and payers, giving them an established and financial interest in health
care data. See generally Lawrence D. Brown, Knowledge and Power: Health
Services Research as a Political Resource, in HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH:
KEYTO HEALTH POLICY 20 (Eli Ginzberg ed., 1991); Coburn, supra; Eisenberg,
supra; Daniel M. Fox, Health Policy and the Politics of Research in the United
States, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POLY & L. 481 (1990) (starting in the 1980s, re-
search became important to governmental entities making health policy).
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tance.' It really fell to the amicus briefs to offer a fuller em-
pirical picture.6
The Justices then struggled openly with questions of em-
piricism. It was a problem they never solved; as in prior cases,
the Justices remained vexed by the role of data.7 They used it
inconsistently and sometimes ignored it altogether. Yet Jus-
tice Souter clearly indicated the importance of the empiricism
problem and Justice Stevens explicitly identified the troubling
gap between clinical reality and the ideal case. Even among
the other Justices, concern about clinical realities moved them
away from acontextual rhetoric. For many of the Justices, the
facts or sheer factual uncertainty drove them to send the as-
sisted suicide question back to the legislatures.
In spotlighting the empiricism problem, the Court demon-
strated a sensitivity to data in these cases that it has often
failed to show in the past. It remains to be seen, however,
whether the legislatures and broader electorate will get the
message.' Yet how they now approach the question of whether
5. See Brief for the Petitioners at 40, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), available
in 1996 WL 656349.
6. See especially Brief of the American Geriatrics Society as Amicus
Curiae Urging Reversal of the Judgments Below, Quill and Glucksberg (Nos.
95-1858, 96-110), available in 1996 WL 656290; Brief of the American Medical
Association, the American Nurses Association, and the American Psychiatric
Association, et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Glucksberg (No.
96-110), available in 1996 WL 656263.
7. A copious literature critiques the Coures approach to data, especially
social science data since that data's first use in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1907). See, e.g., Donald N. Bersoff & David J. Glass, The Not-So Weisman:
The Supreme Court's Continuing Misuse of Social Science Research, 2
ROUNDTABLE 278 (1995); David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-
Finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1991); J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of Scien-
tific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137
(1990).
8. Many analysts have argued that data rarely determine governmental
policy making, though they may serve a general "enlightenment function.-
See, e.g., Richard Lempert, 'Between Cup and Lip": Social Science Influences
on Law and Policy, 10 L. & POLY 167, 183-86 (1988); Carol H. Weiss, Ideol-
ogy, Interests, and Information: The Basis of Policy Positions, in ETHICS, THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES, AND POLICY ANALYSIS 213 (Daniel Callahan & Bruce Jen-
nings eds., 1983). However, as I note above, there are reasons to think that
health care data have become influential, particularly beginning in the 1980s.
See supra note 4.
Some have voiced similar skepticism about whether data play much of a
role in shaping public attitudes. See, e.g., CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, INQUIRY
AND CHANGE 27, 60-61, 214, 216-30 (1990) (arguing, however, that science
should still play a role in supporting "lay probing" to yield "more thoughtful
[Vol. 82:10631066
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to legalize assisted suicide hinges to a significant extent on the
unresolved question of the role of data. For buried in the current
debates over policy and constitutional law is a deeper struggle.
It is a struggle between abstract argument that largely avoids
the data on end-of-life practices and presents future assisted
suicide in idealized terms, and argument that places assisted
suicide in the context of data, tethering claims to the realities
of the clinic.9
This, of course, is a struggle with implications far beyond
assisted suicide. It involves the degree of abstractness and
generality with which we frame rights, 0 and the role of facts-
especially what have been called "legislative facts"---in policy
and constitutional disputes." It has animated a widespread
and informed" preferences). In fact, media communication of evidence from
credible experts and other respected sources seems to have an influence on
public opinion. See BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL
PUBLIC 340-54 (1992); Benjamin I. Page et al., What Moves Public Opinion?,
81 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 23 (1987). Moreover, data may have an indirect impact
by generating an elite consensus that then influences the public's views. See
PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra, at 358-59; JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND
ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 310-11, 319-28 (1992); Lawrence R. Jacobs & Rob-
ert Y. Shapiro, Don't Blame the Public for Failed Health Care Reform, 20 J.
HEALTH POL. POLY & L. 411,422 (1995).
9. Though I am arguing that some of the core arguments offered by re-
spondents and embraced by the Second and Ninth Circuits fell into the trap of
acontextualism in Glucksberg and Quill, advocates on both sides of the as-
sisted suicide debate are perfectly capable of severing the normative argu-
ment from the underlying -facts. Conversely, there are advocates on both
sides who pay careful attention to the clinical facts. Arguments for and
against assisted suicide that demonstrate marked sensitivity to clinical reali-
ties include Howard Brody, Assisted Death-A Compassionate Response to a
Medical Failure, 327 New ENG. J. MED. 1384 (1992) and Ezekiel J. Emanuel,
The Future of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Beyond Rights
Talk to Informed Public Policy, 82 MINN. L. REv. 983 (1998) [this Symposium].
10. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE
CONSTITUTION (1991), in part based on Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf,
Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CmL L. REv. 1057 (1990).
11 See, e.g., Faiginan, supra note 7; Dean M. Hashimoto, Science as My-
thology in Constitutional Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 111 (1997); Rachael N. Pine,
Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamen-
tal Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655 (1988). For flurther analysis of "legislative
facts"-broader questions of fact beyond the adjudicative facts peculiar to the
case at hand-see, for example, Dean Alfange, Jr., The Relevance of Legislative
Facts in Constitutional Law, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 637 (1966); Kenneth Culp Davis,
An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARv. L.
REV. 364 (1942); Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legisla-
tive Facts, 41 VAND. L. REv. 111 (1988). Monahan and Walker have offered an
alternative conceptualization, maintaining that courts creating a rule of law
should regard social science data as "social authority." John Monahan & Lau-
rens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing So-
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revival of interest in pragmatism and its associated empiri-
cism, in the legal academy and beyond.'" The "call to context"'3
is now widely heard.4
That call has a special significance in the world of health
care, particularly at the end of life. 5 The way our medical in-
cial Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 488 (1986). They have also ar-
gued that sometimes "research results are used to construct a frame of refer-
ence or background context"; they call this use "the creation of social frame-
works." Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of
Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (1987).
12. See, e.g., PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY (Michael Brint & William
Weaver eds., 1991); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE
(1979); CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY
OF PRAGMATISM (1989); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitu-
tion, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragma-
tism, 100 YALE L.J. 409 (1990); Symposium, The Revival of Pragmatism, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1996).
13. Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, in PRAGMATISM IN
LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 12, at 247, 261.
14. In this Article I am associating pragmatism with empiricism and atten-
tion to data as well as with concern about context. A substantial literature dis-
cusses and debates these relationships. On pragmatism and empiricism, see, for
example, Thomas C. Grey, What Good Is Legal Pragmatism?, in PRAGMATISM IN
LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 12, at 9; W.V. Quine, The Pragmatists' Place in
Empiricism, in PRAGMATISM: ITS SOURCES AND PROSPECTS 21 (Robert J. Mulva-
ney & Philip M. Zeltner eds., 1981). On pragmatism and contextualism, see, for
example, Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV.
21 (1996); Minow & Spelman, supra note 13; Catharine Wells, Situated Deci-
sionmaking, in PRAGMATISM IN LAw AND SOCIETY, supra note 12, at 275.
15. I argue that the rise of pragmatism is transforming bioethics and health
law in Susan M. Wolf, Shifting Paradigms in Bioethics and Health Law: The
Rise of a New Pragmatism, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 395 (1994). The literature on
pragmatism in bioethics and health law is still relatively scant, but growing. It
includes: Martin Benjamin, Pragmatism and the Determination of Death, in THE
ROLE OF PRAGMATICS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY 47 (Paul Weingartner et
al. eds., 1997); ALBERT R. JONsEN & STEPHEN TOULMN, THE ABUSE OF
CASUISTRY 281-83 (1988); MARY BRIODY MAHOWALD, WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
HEALTH CARE 264-65 (1993); MARTHA MINOW, MAKENG ALL THE DIFFERENCE
312-49 (1990); R. Alta Charo, Principles and Pragmatism, 6 KENNEDY INST.
ETHICS J. 319 (1996); Sharron Dalton, What Are the Sources and Standards of
Ethical Judgment in Dietetics?, 91 J. AM. DIETETIC ASSN 545 (1991); Leonard
M. Fleck, Just Health Care Rationing: A Democratic Decisionmaking Approach,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1597 (1992); Karen Hanson, Are Principles Ever Properly Ig-
nored? A Reply to Beauchamp on Bioethical Paradigms, 69 IND. L.J. 975 (1994);
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); Su-
san H. Williams, Bioethics and Epistemology: A Response to Professor Arras, 69
TND. L.J. 1021 (1994); William J. Winslade, Ethics Consultation: Cases in Con-
text, 57 ALB. L. REV. 679, 683 (1994).
One of the few sustained explorations of pragmatism in bioethics is of-
fered by a set of coauthors writing in Joseph J. Fins et al., Clinical Pragma-
tism: A Method of Moral Problem Solving, 7 KENNEDY INST. ETICS J. 129
(1997), Joseph J. Fins et al., Framing the Physician-Assisted Suicide and Vol-
1998] PRAGMATISM IN THE FACE OF DEATH
stitutions and personnel care for patients facing death is
among the most thoroughly studied of all issues in patient
care. It has generated more empirical literature than practi-
cally any other area.'6 It is at least peculiar, then, to see core
assertions in the debate over assisted suicide put forward as if
none of this information existed. Assisted suicide thus be-
comes an imagined practice with no context. Scholars, advo-
untary Active Euthanasia Debate: The Role of Deontology, Consequentialism,
and Clinical Pragmatism, 43 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC Y 563 (1995), and
Franklin G. Miller et al., Clinical Pragmatism: John Dewey and Clinical Eth-
ics, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 27 (1996). For critique, see Rosema-
rie Tong, The Promises and Perils of Pragmatism: Commentary on Fins, Ba-
chetta, and Miller, 7 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 147 (1997).
16. This copious and growing literature, researching everything from do-
not-resuscitate (DNR) orders to the use of advance directives, includes reports
from the SUPPORT study, the largest ethically driven empirical study to date.
See, e.g., Jan C. Hoffman et aL, Patient Preferences for Communication with
Physicians About End-of-Life Decisions, 127 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1 (1997);
D.J. Murphy & L.E. Cluff, SUPPORT: Study to Understand Prognoses and Pref-
erences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatment: Study Design, 43 J. CLINICAL
EPIDEMOLOGY 15 (Supp. 1990); The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Con-
trolled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study
to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatment
(SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591 (1995); Correction, 275 JAMA 1232 (1996).
For empirical studies on assisted suicide in the United States, see, for ex-
ample, Anthony L. Back et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in
Washington State: Patient Requests and Physician Responses, 275 JAMA 919
(1996); William Breitbart et al., Interest in Physician-Assisted Suicide Among
Ambulatory HIV-Infected Patients, 153 AM. J. PSYCEIATRY 238 (1996); Ezekiel
J. Emanuel et al., Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Attitudes and
Experiences of Oncology Patients, Oncologists, and the Public, 347 LANCET
1805 (1996); Jay A. Jacobson et al., Decedents' Reported Preferences for Physi-
cian-Assisted Death: A Survey of Informants Listed on Death Certificates in
Utah, 6 J. CLNICAL ETHCS 149 (1995).
For such studies in the Netherlands, see, for example, M.T. Muller et aL,
Voluntary Active Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in Dutch Nurs-
ing Homes: Are the Requirements for Prudent Practice Properly Met?, 42 J.
AM. GERIATRICS SOCY 624 (1994); Loes Pijnenborg et al., Life-Terminating
Acts Without Explicit Request of Patient, 341 LANCET 1196 (1993); P.J. van
der Maas et al., Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End
of Life, 22 HEALTH PoLt- 1 (1992); Paul J. van der Maas et al., Euthanasia
and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life, 338 LANCET 669
(1991); Paul J. van der Maas et aL, Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide,
and Other Medical Practices Involving the End of Life in the Netherlands,
1990-1995, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1699 (1996); G. van der Wal et al., Eutha-
nasia and Assisted Suicide. II. Do Dutch Family Doctors Act Prudently?, 9
FAM. PRAC. 135 (1992).
On the rise of empiricism generally in bioethics and health law, see, for
example, Issue, Empirical Research in Medical Ethics (Robert M. Arnold &
Lachlan Forrow eds.), 14 THEORETICAL MED. 195 (1993); Susan M. Wolf,
Quality Assessment of Ethics in Health Care: The Accountability Revolution,
20 AM. J.L. & MED. 105 (1994); Wolf, Shifting Paradigms, supra note 15.
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cates, and judges alike proceed as if the normative policy and
constitutional questions could be answered with little grounding
in clinical reality.'
7
Yet few commentators have directly addressed the role of
empiricism and data in the assisted suicide debate.'" Rarely
named and openly confronted, the confusion over the role of
facts is the ghost in the machine. It ensures the debate will
continue, even if only because the debaters talk past each
other, giving different weight to abstraction and data, yet
never confronting the issue.
This Article is an attempt to face directly the problem of
empiricism's role in the assisted suicide debate. Part I argues
that there are strong reasons to insist on pragmatism and em-
pirical analysis in confronting assisted suicide. Not only are
the data copious, but the life-and-death stakes demand careful
attention to context and current practice. Beyond that, experi-
ence has taught us that abstract, lawyerly conceptions of rights
and transactions work poorly at death's door. The only way ac-
tually to enlarge human freedom and diminish human suffer-
17. In making this claim, I do not intend to fall into the positivist trap of
mistaking scientific data for fundamental truth. Instead, I am making the
pragmatist's claim that what is important is what is likely to work (in the con-
text of assisted suicide, what is likely to work in patient care settings), and that
empirical data are a useful indication of that. On different ways of understand-
ing empiricism, see, for example, David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical
Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1984).
As I indicated above, I am also not claiming that empiricism obviates the
need for normative analysis or that science should substitute for law. See
generally Nancy I Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v.
Wade, 95 YALE L.J. 639 (1986); Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of
Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS
L.J. 155 (1984). Instead, I am suggesting that normative analysis-here, of
assisted suicide-will fail us when it has little grounding in the lives of pa-
tients and pays scant attention to what seems to work for those patients.
In making that argument below I cite to the relevant data sources with-
out revisiting all the numbers here. I am offering a meta-argument on the
role of data, and in any case have written extensively on the data themselves
before. See Susan M. Wolf, Facing Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Chil-
dren and Adolescents, in REGULATING How WE DIE (Linda L. Emanuel ed.,
forthcoming 1998); Susan M. Wolf, Gender, Feminism, and Death: Physician-
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, in FEMINISM & BIOETHICs: BEYOND
REPRODUCTION 282 (Susan M. Wolf ed., 1996); Susan M. Wolf, Physician-
Assisted Suicide in the Context of Managed Care, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 455 (1996).
Ezekiel Emanuel reviews some of the key data elsewhere in this symposium.
See Emanuel, The Future of Euthanasia, supra note 9.
18. An exception is Fins et al, Framing the Physician-Assisted Suicide and
Voluntary Active Euthanasia Debate, supra note 15.
1070 [Vol. 82:1063
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ing at the end of life is to pay careful attention to what is going
on and build from there.
Part H then evaluates the debate leading up to the Su-
preme Court decisions in Glucksberg and Quill. I claim that
the advocates for a constitutional right to assisted suicide in
that litigation, as well as the Ninth and Second Circuits, failed
to heed the call of pragmatism. They showed this in their
framing of the right involved and their claim that constitu-
tional protection of that right would increase patient liberty.
They further showed it in asserting that there was no real dif-
ference between assisted suicide and the already accepted
practice of terminating life-sustaining treatment as well as
what some have called "terminal sedation."9 I argue that by
offering an abstract view of death with little grounding in the
data, they went astray, misdescribing the problem that pa-
tients face and misprescribing a faulty solution.
Part IH turns to the Supreme Court's handling of the em-
piricism problem. The oral argument was haunted by this issue.
The Justices never resolved it, but they took an important step
forward. Justice Rehnquis's opinion for the Court in Glucks-
berg went a long way toward embracing contextualism and
data by framing the right at stake more cautiously than re-
spondents and looking to real practice. Justice Souter's con-
currence struggled explicitly with the empiricism issue, though
he threw up his hands at the complexity of the data at hand
and called for legislative action instead. And Justice Stevens
emphasized the critical gap between the usual case and the
19. For the debate over "termina sedation," see J. Andrew Billings & Susan
D. Block, Slow Euthanasia, J. PALLIATIVE CARE, Winter 1996, at 21; Nathan I.
Cherny & Russell K Portenoy, Sedation in the Management of Refractory Symp-
toms: Guidelines for Evaluation and Treatment, J. PALLIATIVE CARE, Summer
1994, at 31; Robert E. Enck, Drug-Induced Terminal Sedation for Symptom Con-
trol, AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLITIVE CARE, Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 3; Nuala P. Kenny
& Gerri Frager, Refractory Symptoms and Terminal Sedation of Children: Ethi-
cal Issues and Practical Management, J. PALLIATIVE CARE, Autumn 1996, at 40;
Balfour Mount, Morphine Drips, Terminal Sedation, and Slow Euthanasia:
Definitions and Facts, Not Anecdotes, J. PALLIATIVE CARE, Winter 1996, at 31;
Russell K. Portenoy, Morphine Infusions at the End of Life: The Pitfalls in Rea-
soning from Anecdote, J. PALLIATIVE CARE, Winter 1996, at 44; Timothy E. Quill
et al, Palliative Options of Last Resort: A Comparison of Voluntarily Stopping
Eating and Drinking, Terminal Sedation, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Vol-
untary Active Euthanasia, 278 JAMA 2099 (1997); Paul Rousseau, Hospice and
Palliative Care, 41 DISEASEA-MONTH 779, 830-32 (1995); Paul Rousseau, Ter-
minal Sedation in the Care of Dying Patients, 156 ARCHIVEs IiTERNAL MED.
1785 (1996); Robert D. Truog et at, Barbiturates in the Care of the Terminally
11i, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1678 (1992).
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ideal one. Ultimately, of course, the Court turned the assisted
suicide question back to the state legislatures and democratic
process. But the Justices signaled that the electorate and their
representatives need to sort abstract, ungrounded visions of
life's end from those rooted in actual practice and data.
Finally, Part IV considers where we stand after Glucks-
berg and Quill and turns to the debate we now face in the
states. I argue that acontextualism remains an enormous
problem. The sweeping rights that respondents advocated in
the Supreme Court litigation sound appealing in the abstract.
It is only when one begins investigating the underlying factual
assumptions and the realities of care at the end of life that the
picture becomes more complex. Thus, I argue that empiricism
is a critical component of responsible democratic debate. The
Supreme Court implicitly urged careful attention to data and
context. Yet we now risk democratic decisionmaking driven by
abstract slogans, euphemisms, and acontextual fantasies.
That fails to meet the criteria for true democratic delibera-
tion," and it risks great harm to the sickest among us.
Ultimately, this Article is about how we choose to face
death. There is a long history of denial and retreat into fan-
tasy.2' Many have tried to beat the Reaper' with grand rheto-
ric before. And we lawyers can hardly be blamed for trying to
force death into the regime we know, the world of rational
rights-bearers, documents, and arm's length transactions. But
decades of work on death and dying place us now in a new po-
sition. Armed with data, facing death no longer behind closed
doors but in the more public light of the hospital and nursing
home, ' we can start using what we know. We can try to look
20. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOuPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISA-
GREEMENT (1996); Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Deliberating About Bio-
ethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1997, at 38.
21. See, e.g., PHII E AMts, THE HOUR OF OUR DEATH 559-601 (Helen
Weaver trans., 1987); DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE (1993).
22. "There is a Reaper whose name is Death.... " Henry Wadsworth Long-
fellow, The Reaper and the Flowers (1839), stanza 1, in JOHN BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 620b (Emily Morison Beck ed., 14th ed. 1968).
23. On the place of death, see COMMITEE ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE,
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, APPROACHING DEATH 39 (Marilyn J. Field & Chris-
tine KL Cassel eds., 1997) [hereinafter INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT];
NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 2 VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1991, at 380-81 (DHHS pub. no. (PHS) 96-1101, 1996); PRESiDENT s
COMMON FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAvIORAL RESEARCH, DECmING TO FOREGO LE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT 17-18 (1983); Mark A. Sager et al, Changes in the Location of Death
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squarely at death, facing the needs of real patients and care-
givers, insisting on pragmatism at life's end.
I. WHY PRAGMATISM AT DEATH'S DOOR?
The revival of interest in pragmatism is not without con-
troversy. The careful attention to data, actual practice, and
context that are characteristic of pragmatism's inductivism24
also prompt concern. Critics charge that pragmatism is an-
titheory, mindlessly enslaved to facts.' They claim it is so
tethered to the world as we know it that it supports only small
tinkering with the status quo rather than the abrupt changes
that are sometimes needed.2
Yet pragmatism is being embraced in health law, bioeth-
ics, and analysis of clinical care generally in a way that mutes
some of these concerns. Pragmatism's flowering in these areas
is demonstrated by the rise of a vigorous empiricism, the re-
placement of a principle-driven deductivism with a panoply of
more inductive approaches, and an insistence that legal and
ethical prescriptions for clinical behavior withstand empirical
evaluation.27 But this is not the mindless submersion in data
that critics of pragmatism deplore. Instead, this new empiri-
cism is anchored by the long-standing normative commitment
to patient autonomy and welfare that pervades bioethics,
health law, and clinical care itself. Much as some have de-
fended pragmatism generally by insisting that its "call to context"
has normative content in refocusing attention on the powerless
at the bottom, pragmatism in health care can be defended by
citing its commitment to the patient.
After Passage of Medicare's Prospective Payment System: A National Study, 320
NEw ENG. J. MED. 433 (1989).
24. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for
the Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 163 (1995); Grey, What Good Is
Legal Pragmatism?, supra note 14.
25. For analysis of this charge, see, for example, Cornel West, The Limits of
Neopragmatism, in PRAGMATISM iN LAw AND SOCIETY, supra note 12, at 121,
122.
26. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, in
PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 12, at 127; Joseph W. Singer,
Property and Coercion in Federal Indian Law: The Conflict Between Critical and
Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1821 (1990).
27. See Wolf, Shifting Paradigms, supra note 15.
28. See Minow & Spelman, supra note 13, at 261 ("Mhe call to con-
text ... reflects a critical argument that prevailing legal and political norms
have used the form of abstract, general, and universal prescriptions while often
neglecting the experiences and needs of women.... people of color, and people
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Efforts to improve care at the end of life have, in fact, been
the cornerstone of the new empiricism and pragmatism in bio-
ethics. As noted above, end-of-life issues have provoked an
outpouring of data, more than any other issue in bioethics or
health law. Those data have already taught us important les-
sons bearing on the assisted suicide debate.
They have taught that an abstract, lawyerly model of pa-
tients' rights and autonomy does not bear much resemblance to
clinical reality. While many bioethicists promoting patients'
rights are taking this to heart, some advocates for legalizing
assisted suicide are not. The latter embrace a model that de-
picts patients as independent rights-bearers making decisions
at the end of life free from undue pressure and coercion. Yet
there are numerous problems with this vision.
First, patients actually exercise little control over end-of-
life care. For one thing, nature intercedes. Death, after all, is
a physiological process; there is much we cannot control.2
Physicians cannot even reliably say who is terminally ill and
when they will die.30 It is hubris to pretend that patients and
physicians can truly control the dying process.
Beyond the realm of nature, in the domain that human
beings more readily influence, patients themselves actually ex-
ercise little control. Far more powerful than patient choices in
affecting end-of-life care are preexisting patterns of care, dif-
ferences among health care systems, and the setting in which
the patient finds herself." And though setting, at least, may
seem to be something that patients control, in fact they do not
without wealth.").
29. On the need for and illusion of control at the end of life, see CALLAHAN,
supra note 21; Joanne Lynn, Unexpected Returns: Insights from SUPPORT, in
To IMPROVE HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 1997, at 161 (Stephen L. Isaacs &
James R. Knickman eds., 1997).
30. See Eric Chevlen, The Limits of Prognostication, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 337
(1996); Joanne Lynn et al., Defining the "Terminally 1W'l: Insights from
SUPPORT, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 311 (1996); Joanne Lynn et al., Prognoses of Seri-
ously Ill Hospitalized Patients on the Days Before Death: Implications for Patient
Care and Public Policy, 5 NEW HORIzONS 56 (1997).
31- See Lynn, Unexpected Returns, supra note 29, at 178-80; Rosemarie B.
Hakim et al, Factors Associated with Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders: Patients' Pref-
erences, Prognoses, and Physicians' Judgments, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
284,292 (1996); ; Robert S. Pritchard et al., Influence of Patient Preferences and
Local Health System Characteristics on the Place of Death (Sept. 4, 1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). See generally George J. Annas,
How We Lie: Dying Well in the Hospital: Lessons from SUPPORT, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at S12.
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control it to any great extent.32 Moreover, physicians seldom
elicit patient preferences early enough in the terminal process
to have a substantial effect.3 By the time most decisions about
life-sustaining treatment must be effectuated, patients have
already lost decisional capacity.' Even when a patient has left
an advance directive, which is in the minority of cases,35 the di-
rective may be ignored or overridden in the clinic.36
One might respond that this shows the affirmative need
for a normative vision of patients' rights to improve practice.
Yet a normative vision is useless unless it bears some relation-
ship to the reality it seeks to change. All too often the norma-
tive vision proposed for clinical care regards the patient and
health professional as if they were bargaining over widgets in
an arm's length commercial transaction.37 In reality, patients
are profoundly dependent on health professionals, with many
patients reporting that they want their physician to make
treatment decisions for them.38 Even patients who write ad-
vance directives, surely among those patients most interested
in directing their own care, may say they want their directives
32. See, e.g., Julie S. Abramson, Participation of Elderly Patients in Dis-
charge Planning: Is Self-Determination a Reality?, 33 Soc. WORK 443, 447
(1988); James R. Reinardy, Decisional Control in Moving to a Nursing Home:
Postadrnission Adjustment and Well-Being, 32 GERONTOLOGIST 96 (1992).
33. See The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, supra note 16.
34- See Nicholas G. Smedira et at, Withholding and Withdrawal of Life-
Support from the Critically ll, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 309 (1990).
35. See, e.g., ElizabethR. Gamble et at, Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behavior
of Elderly Persons Regarding Living Wills, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 277
(1991); John LaPuma et at, Advance Directives on Admission: Clinical Implica-
tions and Analysis of the Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990, 266 JAMA 402
(1991).
36. See Marion Danis et al, A Prospective Study of Advance Directives for
Life-Sustaining Care, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 882 (1991).
37. This is the source of some of the criticism of law in clinical practice. See,
e.g., John Ladd, Legalism and Medical Ethics, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
BIOMDiCAL ETHICS 1 (John W. Davis et at eds., 1978); Jay Katz, Informed Con-
sent: A Fairy Tale, 39 U. PITT. L. REv. 137 (1977); Carl E. Schneider, From Con-
sumer Choice to Consumer Welfare, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at
S25.
38. See, e.g., Christina G. Blanchard et al., Information and Decision-
Making Preferences of Hospitalized Adult Cancer Patients, 27 Soc. SCL & MED.
1139, 1142-44 (1988); John G. Bradley et at, Patient Preferences for Control in
Medical Decision Making: A Scenario-Based Approach, 28 FAM. MED. 496, 499-
500 (1996); Jack Ende et a, Measuring Patients'Desire for Autonomy: Decision
Making and Information-Seeking Preferences Among Medical Patients, 4 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 23, 26-27 (1989); William AL Strull et at, Do Patients Want to
Participate in Medical Decision Making?, 252 JAMA 2990 (1984).
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to serve only as general guides rather than being effectuated
literally.
39
Beyond the overestimation of patient control at the end of
life, the vision of patients as independent and fully voluntary
decisionmakers is challenged by data on pain and depression.
Pain is widely undertreated in the United States, especially
among children, the elderly, women, and minorities.'0 Yet, as
one might expect, pain is correlated with significant distress
and, in a number of studies, with requests for assisted sui-
cide.' Indeed, acute concern about the abysmal failure to treat
pain and provide appropriate palliative care (to address other
discomforts such as dyspnea that differ from frank pain) has
provoked an outpouring of studies and reform efforts. 2 The re-
search shows, however, that depression is even more strongly
correlated with requests for assisted suicide than pain is.43 Yet
patients routinely face inadequate diagnosis and treatment of
depression." Given these data, a patient requesting assisted
suicide may actually be seeking relief from depression or pain."
These realities suggest that the problem with the abstract
vision of patients' rights is not merely the often-seen gap be-
tween norms and practice. There is a deeper problem. Terminal
patients are quite unlike independent rights-bearers freely ne-
gotiating in business transactions. Instead, they are pro-
39. See Ashwini Sehgal et al, How Strictly Do Dialysis Patients Want Their
Advance Directives Followed?, 267 JAMA 59, 61-62 (1992).
40. See Charles S. Cleeland et al., Pain and Its Treatment in Outpatients
with Metastatic Cancer, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 592, 594-95 (1994); Anne B.
Fletcher, Pain in the Neonate, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1347 (1987); Mary D.
Tesler et al., Postoperative Analgesics for Children and Adolescents: Prescription
and Administration, 9 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 85, 90 (1994).
41. See Kathleen M. Foley, The Relationship of Pain and Symptom Man-
agement to Patient Requests for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 6 J. PAIN &
SYMPTOM MGMT. 289 (1991); van der Maas et al, LANCET, supra note 16, at 672;
van der Wal et al, FAM. PRAC., supra note 16, at 138.
42. See, e.g., Symposium, Appropriate Management of Pain: Addressing the
Clinical, Legal, and Regulatory Barriers, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 285 (1996).
43. See Susan D. Block & J. Andrew Billings, Patient Requests to Hasten
Death: Evaluation and Management in Terminal Care, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
ME. 2039 (1994); Breitbart et al, Interest in Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra
note 16; Emanuel et al., Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note
16; Jacobson et al., supra note 16.
44. See, e.g., Eliseo J. P6rez-Stable et al., Depression in Medical Outpa-
tients: Underrecognition and Misdiagnosis, 150 ARCHiVES INTERNAL MED. 1083,
1086 (1990); Wolf, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Context of Managed Care,
supra note 17, at 466 (analyzing the data on patients in managed care).
45. See Philip R. Muskin, The Request to Die: Role for a Psychodynamic
Perspective on Physician-Assisted Suicide, 279 JAMA 323 (1998).
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foundly dependent, often at the mercy of health professionals
for everything from toileting to life-saving care, and may be
experiencing too much pain, discomfort, or depression to make
independent and truly voluntary decisions.' They may not even
know that relief from their depression or pain is available
without suicide.
Of course, this critique of the adequacy of traditional
rights concepts is not new. Others have argued from the reali-
ties of interdependence to suggest revised visions of rights and
autonomy outside of medical settings.47 But the debate about
end-of-life care too often slides back into a simple rights formu-
lation, ignoring questions about how those rights are likely to
play out in clinical settings.' Patients obviously should not
lose their rights at the hospital admitting office, and patients'
rights to make informed decisions about their care and refuse
unwanted treatment are basic to anything resembling humane
clinical care. But the data caution that we must always ask
how proposed rights will function in clinical settings; we must
see all these rights in context.
H. AVOIDING PRAGMATISM
What does grounding our analysis in context tell us about
the claimed right to assisted suicide? It tells us a great deal.
It reveals problems in respondents' and the circuit courts'
framing of the supposed right and specification of the popula-
46. Certainly one can debate whether and when pain and depression ac-
tually remove decisional capacity. See, e.g., ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W.
BROOK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS 56-57, 68-69 (1989); Robert Weinstock et al,
Competence to Give Informed Consent for Medical Procedures, 12 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 117 (1984). I am not suggesting that they always do.
Rather, I am making the subtler point that they may compromise voluntari-
ness. See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES
OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 163-68 (4th ed. 1994). They may also transform the
assisted suicide decision into an effort to escape the pain and depression, even
though that can be accomplished by nonfatal means. Indeed, patients who get
treatment may stop wanting assisted suicide. See Foley, The Relationship of
Pain, supra note 41, at 290 (suicidal ideation and requests for assisted suicide
commonly "dissolve with adequate control of pain and other symptoms").
More generally, I am arguing that we should not idealize the circumstances
under which patients consider assisted suicide, but rather should face the
problems.
47. See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 15, at 227-372; Jennifer Nedelsky, Recon-
ceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
7(1989).
48. See, e.g., Susan AL Wolf, Gender, Feminism, and Death: Physician-
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, supra note 17, at 298-308.
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tion of rights bearers, in their analysis of the consequences of
recognizing such a right, and in their formulation of the rela-
tionship between assisted suicide and other end-of-life prac-
tices.
A. THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT AND RIGHTS-BEARERS
Glucksberg occasioned extensive debate over how to frame
the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest respondents as-
serted. The Ninth Circuit found a "liberty interest in control-
ling the time and manner of one's death-.., a constitution-
ally recognized 'right to die.'"49 But in the Supreme Court
respondents opted for less sweeping formulations. Professor
Tribe's brief emphasized the right to choose "whether to endure
a death marked by intolerable agony, degradation, and suffer-
ing."50 Kathryn Tucker, the other counsel for respondents,
similarly emphasized that what they sought was not a right to
decide whether to die but how." By framing the right to as-
sisted suicide in these ways, respondents and the Ninth Circuit
tried to identify a right likely to be found constitutionally pro-
tected because it would be seen as broad enough to include
Cruzan's52 right to terminate treatment and Casey's53 right to
choose an abortion.
Yet these abstract formulations make several assumptions.
They assume there is an already existing capacity to control
the time and manner of one's death. But as indicated above,
there is not. Individual patients assert relatively little control.
And even when a patient terminates life-sustaining treatment,
that patient then may or may not die.' Because patients can
49. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 816 (9th Cir. 1996)(en banc).
50. Brief for Respondents at 21, Quill (No. 95-1858), available in 1996 WL
708912. Though Tribe was arguing in Quill, he devoted much of his argument
and brief to the substantive due process questions raised by Glucksberg.
51. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), available in
1997 WL 13671, at *28 (Jan. 8, 1997).
52. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
53. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
54. See, e.g., Margaret L. Campbell et al., Patient Responses During Rapid
Terminal Weaning from Mechanical Ventilation: A Prospective Study, CRITICAL
CARE MED. (forthcoming 1998); Margaret L. Campbell & Richard W. Carlson,
Terminal Weaning from Mechanical Ventilation: Ethical and Practical Consid-
erations for Patient Management, AM. J. CRITICAL CARE, Nov. 1992, at 52; Rich-
ard W. Carlson et al, Life Support: The Debate Continues, 109 CHEST 852 (1996)
(letter). When Karen Ann Quinlan's ventilatory support was terminated, for ex-
ample, she defied all predictions by living another nine years. See Edward
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survive termination of many life-sustaining treatments, re-
spondents and the Ninth Circuit focused on forgoing artificial
nutrition and hydration, arguing that it led to certain death."
Yet some patients may retain the capacity to take food and water
orally, so that terminating tube-delivered sustenance does not
bring on death if oral nutrition and hydration are still offered.
Indeed, a patient forgoing life-sustaining treatment may not be
seeking to hasten death, and may be pleased when she contin-
ues living. 6 Respondents and the Ninth Circuit further
pointed to drugs given for pain relief or sedation in doses that
risk hastening death, claiming that this was another form of
control already asserted over death. 7 But the data cast doubt
on whether these drugs actually terminate life."8
In fact, only the practice that respondents championed and
the Ninth Circuit vindicated, assisted suicide, might be
claimed invariably to control the time and manner of death.
Thus, respondents and the circuit court identified no general
practice of which the Cruzan practice was a subspecies. Re-
spondents were arguing for a new practice and right, but try-
ing to frame it abstractly enough to lean on Cruzan and Casey.
They failed to frame the new right in a way that includes Cruzan.
Yet even their "right to choose" tack, an effort to lean on Casey,
was factually problematic.
Respondents' "right to choose" argument made several im-
portant assumptions. It assumed patients were choosing be-
Walsh, Is There a 'Right to Die'?, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1992, at Z8.
55. See Brief of Respondents at 25-26, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), available in
1996 WL 708925; Brief for Respondents at 1-2, 16, Quill (No. 95-1858), available
in 1996 WL 708912; Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 822-23.
56. See Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, Does It Make Clinical Sense to Equate
Terminally Ill Patients Who Require Life-Sustaining Interventions with Those
Who Do Not?, 277 JAMA 1705, 1706 (1997).
57. See Brief for Respondents at 1, 14-16, 40-41, Quill (No. 95-1858), avail-
able in 1996 WL 708912; Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 822-23, 828.
58. See Frank J. Brescia et al, Pain, Opioid Use, and Survival in Hospital-
ized Patients with Advanced Cancer, 10 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 149 (1992); Pat-
rick Stone et al, A Comparison of the Use of Sedatives in a Hospital Support
Team and in a Hospice, 11 PALLIATIVE MED. 140 (1997); Vittorio Ventafridda et
al, Symptom Prevalence and Control During Cancer Patients'Last Days of Life,
J. PALLIATIVE CARE, Autumn 1990, at 7; William C. Wilson et al., Ordering and
Administration of Sedatives and Analgesics During the Withholding and With-
drawal of Life Support from Critically Ill Patients, 267 JAMA 949, 952 (1992).
See generally Gina Kolata, When Morphine Fails To Kill, N.Y. TIMES, July 23,
1997, at 07. But note that at least one set of authors suggests a distinction in
this debate between opioids and barbiturates, claiming that the latter may has-
ten death even when the former will not. See Truog et al, supra note 19, at
1680-81.
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tween "intolerable agony, degradation, and suffering" and
death." The Ninth Circuit made this assumption as well.' Yet
physicians can relieve terrible pain without causing death,
through aggressive use of analgesics, sedation sometimes to
unconsciousness, nerve blocks, and a host of techniques.61 In-
deed, the data show that pain is not the leading reason why
people opt for assisted suicide, both in the United States' and
the Netherlands.63
Often more difficult to administer than pain relief is effec-
tive palliative care, relief of discomfort that is not frank pain,
such as difficulty breathing or nausea. Yet here, too, a wide
range of techniques including sedation to unconsciousness is
available." It is simply not accurate to say a patient must
choose between intolerable agony and death; in reality, there
are other options.
Respondents' real complaint was that one of these methods
of pain relief and palliative care, specifically sedation to uncon-
sciousness, was unacceptable.65 Rejecting it as degrading and
undignified, they reduced the choice to agony or death. But
that was a "choice" of their own creation. A patient who is un-
conscious will not experience anything as degrading and un-
dignified. And while some patients contemplating sedation to
unconsciousness might prefer to avoid that, much as some pa-
tients are horrified to consider a colostomy or amputation, that
does not eliminate the option.
Respondents and the Ninth Circuit further assumed a fic-
tive rights-bearer choosing freely and independently. They
overlooked the influence of depression and the realities of ex-
treme patient dependency. As noted above, the data tell us
that depression, more than pain, is the reason patients opt for
59. Brief for Respondents at 21, Quill (No. 95-1858), available in 1996 WL
708912.
60. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 814.
6L See ROBERT TWYCROSS, PAIN RELIEF IN ADVANCED CANCER (1994); Ven-
tafridda et al., supra note 58.
62. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
63. On why patients in the Netherlands opt for assisted suicide and eutha-
nasia, see Muller et at, supra note 16, at 626; van der Maas et at, LANCET, su-
pra note 16, at 672; van der Wal et al., FAM. PEAC., supra note 16, at 137-38.
64. See, e.g., Ventafridda et al, supra note 58.
65. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Quill (No. 95-1858), available in 1997
WL 13672, at *55-56 (Jan. 8, 1997) ("[TIhe liberty interest... is the lib-
erty... not to be forced by the government to endure a degree of pain and suf-
fering that one can relieve only by being completely unconscious.").
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assisted suicide.' Yet we know little about appropriately di-
agnosing, much less treating, depression at the end of life,
despite increasing interest in this problem in recent years.'
And there are significant systemic barriers to appropriate di-
agnosis and treatment, with managed care organizations doing
a demonstrably inferior job." Add to this picture the tremen-
dous dependency of these sick and depressed patients upon
their caregivers, and you begin to see the gap between the
rights-bearers that the respondents and the Ninth Circuit de-
picted and the usual realities.' The respondents and the court
posited rights-bearers sufficiently independent and free of undue
influence to exercise a "right to choose" between unalleviated
symptoms and immediate death. But the statistically prevalent
reality is a depressed and dependent patient with inadequately
treated symptoms, driven to a death that is far from freely cho-
sen.
70
Even if a patient were an ideal rights-bearer freely decid-
ing, however, respondents' argument was built on unwar-
ranted assumptions about the dying process in another re-
spect. In seeking the right only for the terminally ill,
respondents claimed we can identify this group. But they
overstated our powers. As discussed above, we cannot predict
who will die when, and we cannot tell in advance of death who is
"terminal." Certainly there are cases in which physicians can
be reasonably sure a patient will die within a few hours, but
those are not cases in which assisted suicide is relevant. The
Ninth and Second Circuits noted the problem, but dismissed it.
The Ninth Circuit treated it as another instance of the small
imprecisions commonly tolerated in applying statutes; the Sec-
ond Circuit simply asserted that doctors would agree who was
66. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
67. See Susan D. Block & J. Andrew Billings, Patient Requests for Euthana-
sia and Assisted Suicide in Terminal Illness: The Role of the Psychiatrist, 5
PSYCHOSOMATICS 445, 448 (1995); Block & Billings, supra note 43, at 2041-42;
William Breitbart & Paul B. Jacobsen, Psychiatric Symptom Management in
Terminal Care, 12 CLINICS GERIATRIC MED. 329 (1996); Terry A. Melvin et al,
Recognition of Depression, HOSPICE J., 1995 (no. 3), at 39; see also Linda Ganzini
et at, Attitudes of Oregon Psychiatrists Toward Physician-Assisted Suicide, 153
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1469,1474 (1996).
68. See Wolf, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Context of Managed Care,
supra note 17.
69. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Wasbington, 79 F.3d 790, 820-21 (9th
Cir. 1996) (en banc) (entirely ignoring depression).
70. See supra note 46.
7L See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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"terminal."' Neither court tackled the substantial uncertainty
that actually attends this prediction.'
B. THE-CONSEQUENCES
Central to respondents' argument and the Ninth Circuit's
analysis was the prediction that recognizing a right to assisted
suicide will enlarge patients' freedom and improve their care.
Further, respondents predicted that state interests in avoiding
error and abuse in assisted suicide could be effectively vindi-
cated through regulation, rather than a ban. Both predictions
ignored the realities of the clinic.
The consequences of recognizing a right to assisted suicide
will depend to a large extent on the context. Over forty million
Americans now lack health insurance,74 and many more are
underinsured. All of these people lack the resources to cope
with serious illness, much less gain access to sophisticated
pain relief and palliative care. Even if they had the resources,
we know that most people now die with significant and under-
treated pain and discomfort." We also know that unrecognized
and undertreated depression is a substantial problem at life's
end. 6
In this context, it is far from clear that simply giving pa-
tients and health professionals the option of exiting all of these
72. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 831; Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716,
731 (2d Cir. 1996). In a similar effort to avoid the problem, respondents sug-
gested that any error would be "in the direction of excessive optimism regard-
ing ... life expectancy." Brief of Respondents at 36 n.24, Glucksberg (No. 96-
110), available in 1996 WL 708925. But the data show the problem is more
complex. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
73. The Ninth Circuit did cite data to show that "allowing the terminally ill
to hasten their deaths" was already widespread and widely supported. Compas-
sion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 810-11. Yet because the court defined "hastening their
deaths" to include the well-accepted and legally mandated practice of honoring
patients' wishes to forego life-sustaining treatment, this showed very little. And
the court demonstrated none of the caution in interpreting polling results and
self-reported clinical practices that all agree is essential. See, e.g., Kathleen V!
Foley, Pain, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Euthanasia, 4 PAIN F. 163, 171
(1995); Letters, The Role of Critical Care Nurses in Euthanasia and Assisted
Suicide, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 971 (1996); Colleen Scanlon, Euthanasia and
Nursing Practice-Right Question, Wrong Answer, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1401
(1996).
74. See Alison Mitchell, Clinton Plan on Medicare Is Opposed, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 1998, at A13.
75. See Cleeland et al, supra note 40, at 593, 595; The SUPPORT Principal
Investigators, supra note 16, at 1595.
76. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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problems through assisted suicide represents an enlargement
of patients' freedom and improvement in their care.' Of
course, one could respond that any new option necessarily in-
creases liberty merely by adding a further possible course of
action. But that argument pretends that each possible course
of action at life's end exists in a vacuum. It ignores their inter-
dependence.
In fact, the only data we now have on the effect of recogniz-
ing a right to assisted suicide come from the Netherlands.
There we find fewer hospice options than in England, which
prohibits assisted suicide. 8 An even stronger indication that
recognizing a right to assisted suicide may threaten the wel-
fare of patients at life's end rather than improving care and se-
curing freedom comes from the data on what the Dutch call
"LAWER," life-terminating actions without patients' consent.79
Though Dutch rules firmly require voluntary patient consent
for assisted suicide and euthanasia," they have been unable to
confine the practices. The substantial incidence of nonvolun-
tary and involuntary practice shows how serious the question
is of whether allowing assisted suicide represents a net gain
for patients.8'
Dutch data, moreover, should underpredict American prob-
lems. After all, the Dutch have universal health insurance, a
more homogeneous society economically and racially, and a
continued tradition of long-standing patient-doctor relation-
77. Cf. TEN.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS
SOUGHT. ASSisTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 89, 120-
21, 134 (1994) [hereinafter N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE] (legalizing assisted suicide
may undermine autonomy in practice); J. David Velleman, Against the Right to
Die, 17 J. MED. & PHIL. 665 (1992) (increasing options may have a negative ef-
fect).
78. See 2 House of Lords, Session 1993-94, Report of Select Committee on
Medical Ethics 112-13 (1994), cited in Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
79. See Pijnenborg et al, supra note 16, at 1196-97.
80. See Margaret P. Battin, Euthanasia: The Way We Do It, The Way They
Do It, 6 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 298, 299-300 (1991); Johan Legemaate, Le.
gal Aspects of Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in The Netherlands, 1973-1994,
4 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHIcS 112,114-17 (1995).
81. On the incidence of nonvoluntary and involuntary practice in the
Netherlands, see Pijnenborg et al., supra note 16; van der Maas et al., NEW
ENG. J. MED., supra note 16. Respondents argued that legitimating assisted
suicide may neither have created this questionable practice nor worsened it
over time. Brief for Respondents at 42 n.21, Quill (No. 95-1858), available in
1996 WL 708912. But they missed the point, that the Dutch have been unable
to control practice in violation of their own rules.
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ships and even house calls.' So Dutch patients should be bet-
ter able to forge a therapeutic partnership untroubled by ra-
cism and economic limitations. They should have fewer diffi-
culties accessing the care they need and finding genuine
alternatives to assisted suicide and euthanasia. They should
also enjoy greater confidence that their physician can respond
to depression, uncontrolled pain and discomfort, and suicidal
ideation by demonstrating genuine understanding and com-
mitment to them. Yet even the Dutch have encountered sub-
stantial problems in keeping assisted suicide and euthanasia
voluntary. Indeed, it appears that for some patient popula-
tions, such as newborns, they are giving up.'
In the American context, the only plausible prediction is
that these problems would be much worse." The Ninth Circuit,
however, dismissed these concerns by labeling them
"ludicrous."" Yet this was simply wishful thinking. Indeed,
the Ninth Circuit's consideration of the risks of recognizing a
right to assisted suicide made further wishful assumptions.
The court found physician involvement in assisted suicide "an
important safeguard," basing this conclusion on predictions
that physicians would refuse to assist suicide in a number of
circumstances and on physicians' supposedly "conservative na-
ture."86 Yet the court cited nothing to support all of this, and it
82. On the Dutch/U.S. comparison, see MARGARET PABST BATrIN, A Dozen
Caveats Concerning the Discussion of Euthanasia in the Netherlands, in THE
LEAST WORST DEATH, supra note 4, at 130; Nancy S. Jecker, Physician-Assisted
Death in the Netherlands and the United States: Ethical and Cultural Aspects of
Health Policy Development, 42 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOcUY 672 (1994); Wolf, Gen-
der, Feminism, and Death, supra note 17, at 295-96, 313-14 n.63.
83. See COMMITTEE OF THE SECTION ON PERNATOLOGY, DUTCH PEDIATRIc
ASSW, To Do or Not To Do? Boundaries of Medical Action in Neonatology
(English summary), in DOEN OF LATEN? GRENZEN VAN HET MEDISCH HANDELEN
IN DE NEONATOLOGIE 11, 14 (1992) (recommending that -[plurposeful ending of
life [be]... possible with the permission of the parents"). For analysis extending
beyond newborns to older children and adolescents, see Wolf, Facing Assisted
Suicide and Euthanasia in Children and Adolescents, supra note 17.
84. On problems in U.S. health care associated with American heterogene-
ity, for example, see Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical
Association, Black-White Disparities in Health Care, 263 JAMA 2344 (1990).
85. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 825 (9th Cir. 1996)
(en banc).
86. Id. at 826-27. The court asserted without any support:
We believe that most, if not all, doctors would not assist a terminally
ill patient to hasten his death as long as there were any reasonable
chance of alleviating the patient's suffering or enabling him to live
under tolerable conditions. We also believe that physicians would not
assist a patient to end his life if there were any significant doubt
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is difficult to imagine what they could have cited. The court
grounded its conclusions in idealizations, not realities.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit and respondents ignored reali-
ties in asserting the adequacy of regulation to vindicate state
interests in avoiding error and abuse in administering assisted
suicide. In fact, the Dutch data have been sobering. The Ninth
Circuit disparaged the Dutch data, relegating them to a foot-
noteY But those data are the most rigorous available, and
should underpredict American problems, as noted above.
Dutch regulation of assisted suicide and euthanasia depends
on physicians reporting each instance to state authorities to
permit monitoring and investigation." Yet data show that the
majority of physicians do not report.89 Consequently, there is
no reliable way to check for error and abuse.
Numerous groups have offered models suggesting how as-
sisted suicide should be regulated in this country." Yet none of
them has dealt seriously with the predictable gap between
written rules and human behavior. The lawyer's assumption
reigns, that prescribing on paper makes it so in real life. Yet
we know that is not true.
C. ASSISTED SUICIDE VERSUS OTHER PRACTICES
Finally, respondents and both circuit courts challenged the
distinction between assisted suicide and the accepted end-of-
life practices of forgoing treatment and aggressive pain relief.
Indeed, the rationality of the distinction between assisted sui-
about the patient's true wishes. To do so would be contrary to the
physicians' fundamental training, their conservative nature, and the
ethics of their profession.
Id. at 827. For further critique of the court's assumptions here, see John D. Ar-
ras, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Tragic View, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POLY 361, 375 (1997).
87. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 830 n.114.
88. See Legemaate, supra note 80, at 115-16; Gerrit van der Wal et al,
Evaluation of the Notification Procedure for Physician-Assisted Death in the
Netherlands, 335 NEWENG. J. MED. 1706 (1996).
89. See van der Wal et al, Evaluation of the Notification Procedure, supra
note 88, at 1707-09.
90. See, e.g., Charles L Baron et al, A Model State Act to Authorize and
Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1996); Steve Helig
et al, Physician-Hastened Death: Advisory Guidelines for the San Francisco Bay
Area From the Bay Area Network of Ethics Committees, 166 W.J. MED. 370
(1997); Franklin G. Miller et al., Regulating Physician-Assisted Death, 331 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 119 (1994); Timothy E. Quill et al, Care of the Hopelessly Ill: Pro-
posed Clinical Criteria for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1380 (1992).
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cide and termination of treatment was the critical question
posed by the equal protection claim in Quill. Respondents fur-
ther argued that a practice of "terminal sedation" is indistin-
guishable from assisted suicide. But the proffered analysis of
all these practices largely avoided the matter of data.
Respondents and the courts first maintained that termi-
nation of treatment could not be rationally distinguished from
assisted suicide because of several claimed similarities. Both
practices were "hastening death" and implicated the "interest
in controlling the time and manner of one's death.' Yet the
courts merely asserted this, without acknowledging the reality
that termination of treatment does not invariably precipitate
death, though assisted suicide does. Respondents and the
courts further asserted that termination of treatment acts as
the cause of death as surely as assisted suicide, rejecting the
argument that termination of treatment allows the underlying
disease or disorder to take its course. But the very fact that
some patients survive termination of treatment challenges this
analysis and suggests that termination of treatment does leave
the patient's death to be determined by the underlying physi-
cal condition. Respondents and the courts lastly suggested
that physicians' intent in both terminating treatment and as-
sisting suicide is to bring about death. But that partly empiri-
cal claim was supported by no data.' Respondents and the
courts never rebutted the common view that physicians remove
life-sustaining treatment to honor patients' wishes and their
right to be free of unwanted treatment, though physicians will
often know that patients may then die.'
91. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996).
92. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816.
93. Gathering good data on physician intent may prove challenging.
Physicians may be reluctant to report an intent to end life and it may be diffi-
cult to design a research instrument that separates intent from foreseeability
and related concepts. See infra note 121, critiquing two studies. Yet data can
be gathered on what physicians report their intent to be in performing various
practices. Cf David A. Asch, The Role of Critical Care Nurses in Euthanasia
and Assisted Suicide, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1374, 1374 (1996) (asking nurses
whether they "act[ed] with the specific intent of causing or hasten-
ing... death"); Wilson et al., supra note 58, at 950 (asking for "reasons").
And it is those mounting a constitutional challenge to state bans on assisted
suicide who must overcome the strong presumption of validity that at-
taches to the legislative distinctions between termination of treatment and
assisted suicide. See Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2297 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S.
312, 319 (1993)).
94. As the Court's opinion in Quill reflects, the common view of end-of-life
practices continues to allow those practices in which the physician foresees
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Because of these difficulties, respondents and the courts
focused on the subset of cases in which artificial nutrition and
hydration are foregone. Here they claimed forgoing treatment
certainly hastens and causes death, and death is intended. Yet
again they offered no data on what the outcome is in these
cases. They failed to deal with those cases in which patients
survive by taking food and water orally. Moreover, they again
provided no support for their analysis of physicians' intent.
Physicians may well terminate this form of treatment, too, in
order to honor patients' wishes and rights to refuse unwanted
treatment, even if the health professionals foresee the likeli-
hood of death. What physicians intend versus what they fore-
see is in part an empirical question.
Leaving termination of treatment, respondents and the
circuit courts next seized on pain relief medication, claiming
that physicians already administer such medication in high
doses hastening death. Yet, as discussed above, this overlooks
the debate about whether such medication actually brings
about death. It also assumes without support that high-dose
medication reliably causes death in these cases, as assisted
suicide would. Respondents and the courts further claimed
that physicians giving these medications intend to cause death,
as in assisted suicide. But they offered no substantial data to
but does not intend death, and to condemn those in which death is intended,
termination of treatment is usually seen as an instance of the former and as-
sisted suicide as an instance of the latter. See Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2298-99.
Yet this analysis of intent and the use of the related principle of double effect
have provoked vigorous critique. See, e.g., Howard Brody, Causing, Intend-
ing, and Assisting Death, 4 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 112 (1993); Frances Kamm,
The Doctrine of Double Effect, 16 J. MED. & PHIL. 571 (1991); Timothy E. Quill
et aL, The Rule of Double Effect-A Critique of Its Role in End-of-Life Decision
Making, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1768 (1997). Full consideration of the debate
is beyond the scope of this Article. My argument here is that those challeng-
ing the rationality of the distinctions among end-of-life practices in Quill and
Glucksberg never offered empirical support for their challenge to the common
view, even though what physicians intend is in part an empirical question.
They did, however, cite one empirical study on nursing practice, in which
some nurses reported administering drugs with the intent to cause or hasten
death, or partly with that intent. See Brief for Respondents at 40, Quill (No.
95-1858), available in 1996 WL 708912 (citing Asch, supra note 93). The in-
terpretation of that study has been much debated. See Letters, supra note 73;
Scanlon, supra note 73; infra note 121. Even outside the Supreme Court liti-
gation, in the literature on intent and double effect, authors have offered ar-
guments (such as that physician intention is complex and may exhibit con-
tradictions, and that physicians who are aware of the principle of double effect
may report their intentions differently) without empirical exploration, even
though many of those arguments invite it. See, e.g., Quill et al., supra, at
1770.
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support this, citing one ambiguous study and ignoring the
other."
Finally, respondents pointed to a practice of "terminal se-
dation," arguing its equivalence to assisted suicide. This claim
is based on a small literature asserting that such a practice
exists and has use.96 That literature, however, is confusing, re-
ferring sometimes to sedating patients to unconsciousness and
waiting for death, sometimes to sedating them and having
them die in response to the medication, and sometimes to the
combination of sedation and forgoing artificial nutrition and
hydration. It was the last of these definitions that respondents
seized upon, arguing that the combination cannot be distin-
guished from assisted suicide.
But respondents never confronted the empirical issues
here. They never indicated how often sedation to unconscious-
ness is coupled with forgoing artificial nutrition and hydration
in an effort to cause death. Thus, they never distinguished the
clinical cases in which a patient chooses to forgo artificial nu-
trition and hydration, the health professional honors that
choice, and sedation is used not to end life but to ensure the
patient feels no discomfort. When the physician intends to
honor the patient's refusal of treatment and assure comfort,
she is not directly intending and engineering death.
The analysis offered by respondents and the circuit courts
thus lumped too much and avoided empirical questions. It as-
sumed that in clinical medicine, unlike other areas of life,
there is no real difference between incurring risk, foreseeing,
and intending. Beyond that, it ignored the relevance of data on
what clinicians actually do risk, foresee, and intend. Yet there
are few settings in which those distinctions are more impor-
tant. Physicians frequently engage in acts that risk death,
such as high-risk surgery; they must, for the health of their
patients. Similarly, physicians must perform interventions
such as withdrawing refused treatment, even if they foresee
the strong possibility of death. Yet in both cases their intent
can and should be not to kill, but rather to improve the pa-
tient's condition or to honor the patient's treatment wishes.
Indeed, it is because we recognize that physicians who perform
risky surgery or honor patients' wishes to refuse treatment are
not killing that physicians are able to serve their patients in
95. The first study is Asch, supra note 93; the second is Wilson et al, supra
note 58. On the limitations of these studies, see infra note 121.
96. See supra note 19.
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these fundamental ways. Yet respondents and the circuit
courts swept these clinical realities aside.
Looking back, then, at how respondents and the two courts
in Glucksberg and Quill framed the right at issue, depicted the
rights-bearers, assessed the consequences of recognizing the
claimed right, and compared other end-of-life practices, the
overall picture is that at critical junctures they largely avoided
the facts. Indeed, the Second Circuit opinion offered almost no
engagement with the data. The Ninth Circuit opinion was
more detailed, with extensive footnotes and professed attention
to "existing circumstances.9  Yet a careful examination shows
that both circuit courts as well as respondents avoided the ac-
tual circumstances in the clinic." Instead, they relied on a vi-
sion of independent rights-bearers freely exercising a right to
choose, driven by agony at life's end, with physicians already
engaged in practices indistinguishable from assisted suicide.
But those are not the realities at life's end.
Ill. THE SUPREME COURT'S STRUGGLE
Against the background of these circuit court opinions and
respondents' argument, it is no surprise that the Supreme
Court struggled with the relevance of data throughout the oral
argument and then in the Justices' published opinions. But
that struggle actually showed progress, as neither circuit court
had wrestled as directly with the problem of empiricism.
Though the Supreme Court ultimately failed to wrestle the
problem to the ground, a careful reading of the Justices' opin-
ions shows that they signaled the importance of data and the
significance of the gap between the usual case and the ideal.
Several of the Justices in oral argument tried to ascertain
how empirical data bore on the constitutional questions at
hand, what those data showed, and whether empirical uncer-
tainty remained so great that it militated in favor of deference
to the state legislatures for now. Justice Breyer remarked,
"[We've had submitted... a gigantic Brandeised brief, which
97. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 803.
98. Perhaps because of this avoidance, respondents and the circuit courts
never directly presented the contextual argument that the reality of second-
best care for many patients-including poor pain relief, palliative care, and
treatment for depression-requires the availability of assisted suicide. Of
course, petitioners might well have replied that the state has a compelling in-
terest in assuring good practice, rather than entrenching bad care that drives
the most vulnerable to assisted suicide by neglecting their needs.
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presents all kinds of empirically based judgments by those who
know.' Justice Kennedy made similar remarks."® But Justice
Souter was the most explicit and troubled in confronting the
empirical issues. He asked, "[Wlhat methodology should I pur-
sue... ? .... [T]here's... an empirical component.., a pre-
diction .... What empirical basis do I have for evaluating that
argument?"
10
'
These questions about the role of data and implications of
empirical uncertainty plagued the Justices in evaluating both
the claimed liberty interest in assisted suicide and countervail-
ing state interests. Justice Kennedy confronted Professor
Tribe with the New York State Task Force report on assisted
suicide, characterizing it as "a Brandeis brief for the proposi-
tion that the autonomy.., that you wish to create, is illu-
sory,... that there will be less autonomy... if you allow the
option.... In fact, you will be introducing fear into medical
care facilities. You will diminish the choices, not increase
them."" Tribe responded with no data, but the assertion that
fear already stalks medical facilities, as physicians covertly
cause death by increasing pain relief medication and adminis-
tering "terminal sedation" with few safeguards. 3 Yet that de-
batable description of current realities' failed to answer the
Justice's query about the likely effects of legalizing assisted
suicide and whether the claimed liberty interest would actually
contract not expand patients' liberty.
Further colloquy took up the empirical questions on the
other side of the equation, the states' countervailing interests.
As noted above, Justice Souter explicitly addressed the ques-
tion of what data supported the prediction of abuse and other
harms that would justify state action. The Assistant Attorney
General of Washington pointed to the Dutch data and German
99. Transcript of Oral Argument, Quill (No. 95-1858), available in 1997 WL
13672, at *26 (Jan. 8, 1997) (presumably referring to the scores of amicus briefs
submitted).
100. See id. at *47-48.
101. Transcript of Oral Argument, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), available in 1997
WL 13671, at *8-9 (Jan. 8, 1997).
102. Transcript of Oral Argument, Quill (No. 95-1858), available in 1997 WL
13672, at *47-48 (Jan. 8, 1997).
103. Id. at *48-49.
104. Acting Attorney General Dellinger, for example, stated, 'We do not
know any basis for the conclusion that pain medication is being deliberately of-
fered in excess of what is necessary to relieve pain in order to cause death." Id.
at *30.
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experience between the World Wars, with Justice Ginsburg
adding that the Australian experience might be relevant.05
The Assistant Attorney General emphasized the problem of in-
voluntary deaths in the Netherlands.'1 Yet here again the dis-
cussants did not engage substantively with the data.
Debate over the risks of legalizing assisted suicide led to
argument over the likely efficacy of safeguards. Acting Solici-
tor General Dellinger emphasized the lack of data: "[Tihere's
no experiential basis for the conclusion that there could be
adequate safeguards .... '07 Justice Souter suggested that the
Court should therefore wait to render "ultimate judgment."' 8
Ultimately, Justice Souter despaired of empirical uncer-
tainty. He challenged counsel for respondents, saying, "lIlt
may be impossible for a court to assess... [the substantive due
process question] until there is more experience out in the
world.... It would just be guesswork."1" More than any other
Justice, he pinpointed the need for a grounding in clinical real-
ity. In the oral argument he emerged as the advocate for
pragmatism.
The published opinions made clearer the differences
among the Justices in their views of the role of data and clini-
cal realities. For the most part, they muddled through, relying
on the data in some places and ignoring the data in others.
But a number of them also gave clear indication that the data
were important.
The Chief Justice, writing for the Court in Glucksberg,
emphasized that the claimed liberty interest should not be
seen abstractly."0 But he relied more on the long history of le-
gal prohibition than on any empirical analysis of the practice."
105. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), available in
1997 WL 13671, at *10-12 (Jan. 8, 1997).
106. See id. at *60.
107. Id. at *22.
108. Id. at *23.
109. Id. at "44.
110. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2270 ("The right assumed in Cru-
zan... was not simply deduced from abstract concepts of personal autonomy.");
see also Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2301 ("[Olur assumption of a right to refuse treat-
ment was grounded not, as the Court of Appeals supposed, on the proposition
that patients have a general and abstract right to hasten death'... ." (citations
omitted)).
111. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271 ("The history of the laws treatment
of assisted suicide in this country has been and continues to be one
of... rejection.... That being the case .... the asserted 'right! ... is not afun-
damental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.").
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It was not until he assessed whether Washington's ban was
"rationally related to legitimate government interests""' that
he addressed the data. There he noted research showing that
depression, although an important risk factor for assisted sui-
cide, is often undertreated, and that many people stop seeking
assisted suicide once their depression and pain are treated."'
He similarly explored "the real risk of subtle coercion and un-
due influence in end-of-life situations.""4 But his engagement
with the data did not become pronounced until he reviewed the
Dutch research showing that the risk of abuse has become a
reality there, as the legitimation of voluntary euthanasia and
assisted suicide has led to euthanasia and drug overdoses
without patient consent."5 It was the Dutch data that led him
to contrast abstract argument with real experience: "[I]t turns
out that what is couched as a limited right.., is likely, in ef-
fect, a much broader license, which could prove extremely diffi-
cult to police and contain.""6
The Chief Justice engaged less with the role of data in his
opinion for the Court in Quill. There, of course, the central
question was whether a state could rationally distinguish be-
tween assisted suicide and terminating life-sustaining treat-
ment. The question of whether the two practices can be distin-
guished is a mixed question of logic and data. The Chief
Justice relied heavily on traditional formulations of causation
and intent to distinguish the two logically, but ignored the
relevance of data. The omission was signaled by the Chief
Justice's own awkward formulation: "[A] physician
who... [terminates treatment] purposefully intends, or may so
intend, only to respect his patient's wishes" rather than intend-
ing '"that the patient be made dead."" 7 The Chief Justice re-
lied on the same formulation in distinguishing aggressive pain
relief from assisted suicide: "[I]n some cases, painkilling drugs
may hasten.., death, but the physician's purpose and intent
is, or may be, only to ease his patient's pain." ' He clarified
112. Id.
113. See id. at 2272-73.
114. Id. at 2273.
115. See id. at 2274 ("This study suggests that, despite the existence of vari-
ous reporting procedures, euthanasia in the Netherlands has not been limited to
competent, terminally ill adults who are enduring physical suffering, and that
regulation... may not have prevented abuses .....
116. Id. at 2274.
117. Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2298-99 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 2298-99 (emphasis added). The Chief Justice made no mention of
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that he was "not insist[ing] ... that 'in all cases there will in
fact be a significant difference... [in] intent,'" but merely that
"the State is entitled to act on the reasonableness of the dis-
tinction.""' But data have raised the question of whether
health professionals administer the last dose of painkilling
drugs in part to hasten death.' 20 These data are debatable and
raise more questions than they answer.'21 They do indicate,
however, the relevance of empirical research. If data were to
show that health professionals terminating life-sustaining
treatment or administering painkilling drugs often intend to
end life, it would at least challenge the reasonableness of the
legislative distinction."
Thus, the Chief Justice's opinions in the two cases failed to
use data consistently. Yet he recognized that the debate over
assisted suicide concerns its "morality, legality, and practical-
ity." " He spotlighted the difference between argument and
real-world effect.
The other Justices similarly struggled with the role of
data, some more explicitly than others. Justice O'Connor,
the data casting doubt on whether painkilling drugs do hasten death. See supra
note 58.
119. Id. at 2302 n.12 (citations omitted).
120. See Asch, supra note 93 (considering both painkillin drugs and seda-
tives); Wilson et at, supra note 58, at 952 (same).
121. In the Wilson et al study the sample size was extremely small, making
it more a provocative pilot study than a definitive analysis. In addition, those
who responded were asked their "reason" for giving the last dose, with the op-
tion of specifying more than one. See Wilson et al, supra note 58, at 949. The
researchers left unexplored with the subjects what each meant by "reason," how
that related to intended goals or simply foreseen and accepted results, and how
important a reason hastening death was in the cluster of reasons identified.
However, follow-up discussion led the researchers to conclude that subjects were
foreseeing but not seeking death, in accord with the principle of double effect.
See Ud at 953. In the Asch study, subjects were asked if they had
"perform[ed] ... act[s] with the specific intent of causing or hasten-
ing.., death." Asch, supra note 93, at 1374. But "specific intent" was never
defined for these health professionals and distinguished from foresight. And
examples offered of such "actfs]" included increasing the morphine dose in an
unconscious patient, even though in some clinical circumstances that might be
done without the intent to cause death. For critique on this and other points,
see Letters, supra note 73; Scanlon, supra note 73.
122. Of course, the legislature could still defend the distinction. It could ar-
gue, for instance, that terminating treatment or administering painkilling drugs
with the intent of ending life is illicit and should be forbidden. Assisted suicide
could thus still be distinguished from the licit forms of terminating treatment
and relieving pain. But my point is that the data are relevant; they potentially
change the argument.
123. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275 (emphasis added).
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whose vote made a majority of five subscribing to the Chief
Justice's opinion, nonetheless wrote her own concurrence. She
agreed with the Court "that there is no generalized right to
'commit suicide,"" but delayed to another day the question of
whether a competent, suffering person has a constitutionally
protected "interest in controlling the circumstances of his or
her imminent death."" She postponed that question not only
because she saw the cases at hand as facial challenges to the
two state laws, but also because of an empirical conclusion-
that terminal patients in Washington and New York faced "no
legal barriers" to pain relief and palliative care.' But a sub-
stantial literature shows that legal requirements, such as
mandated triplicate prescriptions, do discourage this treat-
ment. '2 While Justice O'Connor found no express legal prohi-
bition, she ignored the other ways in which law has been
shown to create significant barriers. Thus, she never consid-
ered whether the bans at issue work together with other state
law to inhibit adequate pain relief and palliative care.
Justice Breyer largely followed Justice O'Connor's lead.
He differed with the Chief Justice's formulation of the liberty
interest at stake, characterizing it as a "'right to die with dig-
124. Id. at 2303.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. On the barriers posed by legal requirements, including in New York
and Washington State, see, for example, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, su-
pra note 23, at 190-98; N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 77, at 171-75;
Katherine A. Sigler et al., Effects of a Triplicate Prescription Law on Prescrib-
ing Schedule II Drugs, 41 AM. J. HOSP. PHARMACY 108 (1984); Michael Wein-
traub et al., Consequences of the 1989 New York State Triplicate Benzodi-
azepine Prescription Regulations, 266 JAMA 2392 (1991); see also C. Stratton
Hill, Jr., Government Regulatory Influences on Opoid Prescribing and Their
Impact on the Treatment of Pain of Nonmalignant Origin, 11 J. PAIN &
SYMPTOM MGMT. 287, 288 (1996); Chris Stem Hyman, Pain Management and
Disciplinary Action: How Medical Boards Can Remove Barriers to Effective
Treatment, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 338 (1996); Sandra H. Johnson, Discipli-
nary Actions and Pain Relief- Analysis of the Pain Relief Act, 24 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 319 (1996); David E. Joranson et al., Opioids for Chronic Cancer and
Non-Cancer Pain: A Survey of State Medical Board Members, FED'N BULL.: J.
MED. LICENSURE & DISCIPLINE, June 1992, at 15; Russell K. Portenoy, The
Effect of Drug Regulation on the Management of Cancer Pain, N.Y. STATE J.
MED., Nov. 1991, at 13S. Clearly, one could argue that in a perfect world
physicians would not be discouraged from providing adequate pain relief by
requirements such as triplicate prescription mandates. Thus, one could main-
tain that such barriers are not so much legal as psychological. But that would
be falling into the trap of evaluating law simply as it is written, not as it
functions in the world.
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nity.'" ' But he maintained that the state bans infringe that
fundamental right only if they prevent adequate pain relief.
He concluded, in a vein similar to Justice O'Connor's, that pain
relief is hampered not by state law but by institutional prac-
tices. He therefore concluded that the state bans do not in-
fringe a fundamental right."' His opinion thus suffered from
the same basic flaw as Justice O'Connor's: ignoring the ways in
which state law does pose barriers.
Justice Stevens grappled more directly than Justices
O'Connor and Breyer with the role of data. He, too, differed
with the Court on the proper level of generality at which to
formulate the liberty interest at stake, insisting on greater
generality.'30 But it was his consideration of the countervailing
state interests that led him to practical questions about how
people die, what problems the state legitimately addresses,
and what life-ending practices physicians already engage in
and support. He ultimately came to the conclusion that the
state's general policy against assisted suicide "is justified by
the fact that the "ideal" case.., is not the usual case."'3' He
went on to conclude that an individual's "as applied" challenge
might later succeed, presumably in a case that was not
"usual."'32 Thus, Justice Stevens came close to identifying the
pragmatism problem at the heart of these cases. His opinion
turned on an empirical judgment-the difference between the
ideal case and the usual. He never really illuminated the
grounds for his empirical conclusion.33 But he did point to the
empirical problem.
Justice Souter's opinion was by far the most explicit in ad-
dressing the role of data, as were his questions at the oral ar-
gument. He emphasized the need to ascertain the "level of
generality at which to analyze claims and counter-claims," to
attend to "detail," and to "examin[e] the concrete application of
principles."" In this he virtually declared the pragmatist's credo.
128. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2311.
129. See id. at 2311-12.
130. See id. at 2305-07.
131. Id. at 2309 (citing N.Y. STATE TASKFORCE, supra note 77, at 120).
132. Id.
133. The closest he came to identifying the basis of his central empirical
conclusion about what is "usual" was citation of the New York State Task Force
report. See id. at 2309 (citing N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 77, at 120).
He cited far more to suggest he might overturn a state ban, given the proper
individual challenge. See id. at 2308-10.
134- Id at 2290. Justice Souter credited Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v.
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Yet after recognizing a liberty interest, he ended up finessing
analysis of its ultimate strength, focusing instead on the coun-
tervailing state interests, which he found dispositive.'35 There he
concentrated almost entirely on the state interest in preventing
a slide down the slippery slope to involuntary suicide and
euthanasia. Justice Souter considered a variety of factors, from
the financial incentives impinging on doctors in managed care to
physicians' temptation to deliver the life-ending drugs them-
selves, and found the case for a slippery slope plausible.'36 De-
spite his proclaimed commitment to "detail" and practical con-
siderations, he actually referred to no data in considering those
factors. Indeed, not until he considered the Dutch situation did
he engage the data, claiming that only the Netherlands has
yielded information on how state regulations might affect prac-
tice.'37 In this claim he was wrong, as American data are rele-
vant as well to the slippery slope question and likely efficacy of
regulation, including data on whether doctors already defy pro-
hibitions on assisted suicide and euthanasia and whether they
do so in cases of neonates and others incapable of giving volun-
tary consent.'38 Even focusing on the data he acknowledged,
Justice Souter was reluctant to conclude much. Despite well-
known data from the Netherlands showing that Dutch guide-
lines are violated by a substantial incidence of "life-terminating
acts without consent," including among neonates,' Justice
Uliman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), with setting the model See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
at 2285.
135. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2290 ("Whether that [liberty] interest
might... be seen as 'fundamental' to the degree entitled to prevail is not... a
conclusion that I need draw here, for I am satisfied that the State's inter-
ests... defeat the present claim that its law is arbitrary or purposeless."). This
contrasts with the Chief Justice's view at oral argument that "if we assume a
liberty interest but nonetheless say that... a state can prohibit it entirely, that
would be rather a conundrum." Transcript of Oral Argument, Glucksberg (No.
96-110), available in 1997 WL 13671, at *14 (Jan. 8, 1997).
136. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2291.
137. See id. at 2292.
138. See, e.g., Back et al, supra note 16; Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Euthanasia:
Historical, Ethical, and Empiric Perspectives, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
1890, 1898-99 (1994); Emanuel et al., Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Sui-
cide: Attitudes and Experiences, supra note 16; Wolf, Facing Assisted Suicide
and Euthanasia in Children and Adolescents, supra note 17; Death at U.C. Med
Center, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Mar. 30, 1995, at A20; Doctor Faces Murder
Count in Premature Baby's Death, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 13, 1993, at A20.
139. See, e.g., Pijnenborg et al, supra note 16; van der Maas et at, HEALTH
POL'Y, supra note 16, at 143-45; van der Maas et al, LANCET, supra note 16, at
670; van der Maas et at, NEw ENG. J. MED., supra note 16; see also Wolf, Facing
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Children and Adolescents, supra note 17.
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Souter found the "evidence... contested."" He then concluded
that in the face of serious factual controversy, the legislatures
rather than the courts are the proper institution to explore and
resolve the matter.' He decided that the greater institutional
competence of the legislatures should stay the Court's hand for
now.
Thus the Justices in these two cases demonstrated a range
of approaches to the role of empirical data, but they did see the
data as important. Justice Souter found empirical uncertainty
to be a compelling argument for judicial deference to the state
legislatures. Justice Stevens rested his conclusion that state
bans are constitutional on the gap between the ideal and the
usual case. Justices O'Connor and Breyer regarded the sup-
posed lack of legal barriers to pain relief and palliative care as
key to delaying consideration of narrower challenges to state
bans. And the Chief Justice found that realities suggested by
the data undermined respondents' abstract argument. The
Justices thus clearly indicated that data play a critical role in
this debate.
In effect, they issued a call to pragmatism. Justice Ste-
vens emphasized the importance of focusing on the usual case.
Justice Souter called on legislatures "to obtain the facts."'42
Even the majority opinion in Glucksberg reminded Americans
that they were debating the "practicality" of assisted suicide.
The Court urged that data inform the legislative and demo-
cratic process.
140. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2292. Unfortunately, Justice Souter relied on
two nonempirical sources here, plus one that failed to analyze euthanasia or as-
sisted suicide without consent but did find that a substantial number of family
physicians reported failing to follow the applicable procedural requirements.
See van der Wal et al, FAL PRAC., supra note 16. The relevant question, in any
case, is not whether the data showing that "the Dutch guidelines
have... failed to protect patients from involuntary euthanasia" are contested.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2292. In fact, there is no dispute over whether in-
voluntary euthanasia occurs in the Netherlands; the data are dear. See supra
note 139. Equally clear is that Dutch procedural safeguards demanding phy-
sician reporting are often ineffective. See van der Wal et al., Evaluation of the
Notification Procedure, supra note 88. What is disputed is the normative
question of whether this represents a serious problem, and the predictive
question of what this augurs for the United States.
141. "We... have a dear question about which institution, a legislature or a
court, is relatively more competent to deal with an emerging issue as to which
facts currently unknown could be dispositive. The answer has to be... that the
legislative process is to be preferred." Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2293.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2275.
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IV. AFTER GLUCKSBERG AND QUILL:
DEMOCRACY OUT OF CONTEXT
The Supreme Court decisions returned the assisted suicide
debate to the states. Yet it is worth asking what kind of debate
we will now have. Sloganeering campaigns, ballot measures
divorced from factfinding, and legislative initiatives unin-
formed by the realities of dying will ill-serve the patients of
this country. The life-and-death question of whether physi-
cians should be allowed to violate the ancient Hippocratic
commitment to "give no deadly drug, even if asked'" is too se-
rious for anything less than truly deliberative democracy.
Unfortunately, there is ample cause for concern. Three
states-California, Washington, and Oregon-have held
popular votes on ballot measures to change state law.' 4 In all
three cases the proposals were ambiguously worded. Both the
California and Washington measures used "aid-in-dying" to
signify "physician-assisted suicide," even though the euphe-
mism could mean anything from hospice care, to termination of
treatment, to lethal injection.'" Oregon was more direct, but
still labeled its proposed statute a "Death with Dignity Act"
and even included the obfuscating declaration that "[aictions
taken in accordance with this Act shall not... constitute sui-
cide, [or] assisted suicide."47 Further, although debate on the
measures was vigorous, it is unclear whether data were
reaching the public to inform their views.'" Indeed, one of the
standard critiques of direct democracy through the ballot box is
that voter knowledge and competency are low.'49
Oregon voters, of course, have been the only ones to pass
an assisted suicide measure. But in the campaign that re-
sulted in initial passage in 1994, some of the focus was di-
144. Leon R. Kass, Neither for Love nor Money: Why Doctors Must Not Kill,
94 PUB. INTEREST 25, 37-8 (1989).
145. Each of these states has a process for legislative enactment by popular
initiative. See Judith F. Daar, Direct Democracy and Bioethical Choices: Voting
Life and Death at the Ballot Box, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 799, 802-03 (1995).
146. See Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-
Assisted Suicide: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Vidlage, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1,
20-21 (1996).
147. Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Measure 16 § 3.14 (codified at OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 127.80-.877 (Supp. 1996)). See generally Rita L. Marker & Wesley J.
Smith, The Art of Verbal Engineering, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 81,87-89 (1996).
148. See Daar, supra note 145, at 841 (discussing the "personal nature of the
material disseminated and discussed" in the California and Washington cam-
paigns). On the impact data can have on public opinion, see supra note 8.
149. See, e.g., id. at 837-40.
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verted from assisted suicide to the role of the Catholic
Church.'" And regrettably, the state's medical association,
representing the profession whose role and ethics were directly
at stake, failed to take a position.' Litigation then delayed ef-
fectuation of the new statute," followed by a legislative demand
for a popular re-vote. This legislative maneuver so angered the
public that reenactment of the assisted suicide measure was
widely seen both before and after the vote as a protest of the
legislature's lack of respect for the ballot initiative process."
One reporter concluded that the Oregon debate was
"rarely... as 'earnest and profound' as the [Supreme Court]
Justices might have hoped."
Numerous other states have seen assisted suicide bills in-
troduced in their legislatures 5 and surely others will in the fu-
ture. We have to wonder whether such legislatures will engage
in the kind of searching factfinding process that Justice Souter,
in particular, envisioned and this question clearly demands."6
The U.S. Congress has held hearings," culminating in legisla-
tion denying federal funding for assisted suicide.' But the
150. See Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1994, § 1, at 11
(reporting a television spot asking, "Are we going to let one church make the
rules for all of us?").
151. See Melinda A. Lee & Susan Tolle, Oregon's Assisted Suicide Vote: The
Silver Lining, 124ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 267,268 (1996).
152. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995), vacated and re-
manded, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Lee v. Harcleroad, 118
S. Ct. 328 (1997).
153. See, eg., William Claiborne & Thomas B. Edsall, Affirmation of Oregon
Suicide Law May Spur Movement, WASH. PosT, Nov. 6, 1997, at A19; William
Claiborne, Death with Dignity' Measure May Make Oregon National Battle-
ground, WASH. POST, June 27, 1997, at A19 (citing poll showing 81% "felt the
legislature was wrong to make Oregonians vote.., a second time").
154. Timothy Egan, Assisted Suicide Comes Full Circle, to Oregon, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26,1997, at 1.
155. See, e.g., H.B. 691, 90th Gen. Ass., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (E1. 1997); H.P.
663, 118th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 1997); S.B. 81, 89th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess.
(Mich. 1997).
156. On legislative attention to data, especially on health care questions, see
supra note 4. The question of what empirical basis the courts may later require
when and if they review statutes legalizing assisted suicide is beyond the scope
of this Article. See generally Wendy KV Rogovin, The Politics of Facts: " he Illu.
sion of Certainty", 46 HASrINGS L.J. 1723 (1995).
157. See Assisted Suicide: Medical, Ethical, and Social Issues, Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Health and Env't of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th
Cong. (1997); Assisted Suicide in the United States, Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
(1996).
158. Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-12,
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question of whether state bans on assisted suicide will be
lifted, at least as applied to physicians assisting competent,
terminally ill adults, rests with the states.
Whether states will rise to the occasion and engage in what
Gutmann and Thompson call "deliberative democracy" remains
to be seen. "Deliberative democracy is the opposite of soundbite
democracy... where insults are traded, slogans proclaimed,
and self-serving deals are made . Instead, deliberative
democracy promotes the legitimacy of group decisions, a public-
spirited outlook, a mutually respectful process, and the ability
to correct mistakes as issues are considered." A vital part of
this has to be getting beyond slogans and acontextual abstrac-
tions to the facts necessary for deliberation and a thoughtful
policy decision. 6'
CONCLUSION
The assisted suicide debate requires a larger discussion
that has not yet occurred on the role of data and empiricism in
the constitutional and policy questions. In the absence of that
discussion, the debate too often veers into ungrounded ab-
straction. But the data tell an important story. They show
that patients need not choose between agony and assisted sui-
cide; numerous techniques for pain relief and palliative care
are available, including sedation to unconsciousness. When
patients do seek assisted suicide, it is usually because un-
treated depression or inadequate pain relief drives them.
These patients are not independent agents freely choosing an
uncoerced option, as in a commercial transaction. And termi-
nation of life-sustaining treatment, high-dose pain relief, and
sedation to unconsciousness are distinct practices with signifi-
cant therapeutic uses, each one distinguishable from assisted
suicide.
Why do we find the data so often ignored? Motivating
public, legislative, and judicial attention to data can be an
uphill battle generally. Even in the realm of health care
where data dominate, and in the assisted suicide debate
111 Stat. 23 (codified primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 14401-08 (Supp. 1997)).
159. Gutnann & Thompson, DeliberatingAbout Bioethics, supra note 20, at 39.
160. See id.
161. Indeed, Gutmann and Thompson suggest a further condition, that
"empirical claims... be consistent with relatively reliable methods of in-
quiry... [, allowing] discussion on mutually acceptable terms." GuTmAN &
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 20, at 56.
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where all agree the data are germane, significant barriers re-
main. Myths about care at the end of life are hard to dispel.
And the realities of death itself, as I have suggested, prompt us
to flee. Yet there is a further reason for ambivalence toward
the data that is embedded in the way we think about facts and
empiricism. We are on the cusp, moving from one way of
thinking to another. The debate on assisted suicide comes to
the fore just as bioethics and health law struggle through what
I have argued elsewhere is a paradigm shift from an old de-
ductivism that largely ignored empiricism to a new pragma-
tism that extols it."e The debate on assisted suicide manifests
the conflict or, more optimistically, the transition between
those two approaches.
We should hope the transition succeeds. Abstract procla-
mations of patients' rights that bear little relation to clinical
reality will accomplish equally little for patients facing death.
Bioethics and health law are embracing pragmatism for a rea-
son-to help real patients in the world.
162. Wolf, Shifting Paradigms, supra note 15.
1101

